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ADDITIONAL DUTIES IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS*
An increasingly heavy workload in the federal district courts prompted congres-
sional passage of the Federal Magistrates Act (28 U.S.C. § 636). The Act was
drafted to facilitate delegation of judicial duties to magistrates. However, since the
Act was implemented, unduly cautious and restrictive court interpretations of its
language have hindered flexible delegation of dutties to magistrates. The author re-
views the magistrates' role in civil matters concluding that the way to resolve con-
flicting court interpretations of the Act is through legislation. The author critically
examines recent legislation and suggests how the use of magistrates could enhance
judicial efficiency without sacrificing the quality of justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE 90" CONGRESS, after three years of consideration and hearings,
abolished the system of United States Commissioners and replaced it
with the system of United States Magistrates for federal district courts.' The
enactment was prompted by concern for the unmanageable dockets and
caseloads of the United States District Courts and the need to provide assis-
tance to federal district judges. The magistrate system was intended "both to
update and make more effective a system that has not been altered basically
for over a century, and to cull from the ever-growing workload of the U.S.
district courts matters that are more desirably performed by a lower tier of
judicial officers." '2
*The author of this Note wishes to express his appreciation to Professor Sidney B. Jacoby,
who introduced the "famous cases" of federal courts to a generation of law students.
i. Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1108 (1968), amending 28 U.S.C. §§
631-39 (1964), (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-39 (1970), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 634(a), 636
(e) (Supp. IV, 1974) ).
A comparison of magistrates'with commissioners illustrates the increased responsibility and
expertise Congress intended magistrates to have. Commissioners were formerly appointed by
the district court for a term of four years, the number of commissioners being determined by
each court's own assessment of its need. There were no specific qualifications for commission-
ers; in fact, over one-third were nonlawyers. H.R. REP. No. 1629, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., re-
printed in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4252, 4256 [hereinafter cited as HousE
REPORT] (citation is to U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws). By contrast, the Judicial Conference
now assesses the needs of each district and appoints magistrates with the concurrence of a
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Magistrates' jurisdiction is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636. In general,
magistrates have the power to conduct trials of minor offenses and petty
offenses;3 to administer oaths and affirmations, impose conditions of release,
and take acknowledgments, affidavits, and depositions; 4 and to perform addi-
tional duties delegated by local court rules that are consistent with the Con-
stitution and laws of the United States. 5 Magistrates are also empowered to
exercise all the powers and fulfill all the duties conferred upon United States
Commissioners by law or by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for
district courts.
6
majority of the judges in each district. 28 U.S.C. § 631(a), 633 (1970). Magistrates are qual-
ified as full- or part-time officers, and the determination of whether a full-time or part-time
magistrate is appointed is a function of the particular caseloads and requirements of each dis-
trict. See 28 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1970). Part-time magistrates are presently appointed for a four
year term, but full-time magistrates serve an eight year term. 28 U.S*.C. § 631(e) (1970).
The impact of the magistrates' appointment and tenure provisions is significant. The perfor-
mance of magistrates and the needs of district courts are constantly reviewed by the Judicial
Conference in its oversight function. 28 U.S.C. § 633 (1970). The tenure provision enhances the
attractiveness of the position and assures job security; removal is only for cause. 28 U.S.C. §
631(h) (1970). The higher standard qualifications for office, 28 U.S.C. § 631(b) (1970), and the
statutorily required periodic training, 28 U.S.C. § 637 (1970), insure judicial independence and
disinterest and necessarily guarantee the greater expertise required as magistrates are delegated
expanded responsibility pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1970). HOUSE REPORT 4254. The magis-
trate is required to take the same oath of office as a judge. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 631(o (1970),
with 28 U.S.C. § 453 (1970). Furthermore, a magistrate is restricted as to the character of
service and outside interests. 28 U.S.C. § 632 (1970).
The method of compensation for magistrates has also been vastly improved. Commissioners
were paid on the basis of an anachronistic fee system where compensation was measured by the
nature of the function and decision itself. Because a ceiling on fees was enforced, commissioners
often earned the maximum after a few months each year. S. REP. No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967), cited in HOUSE REPORT 4255. This system may have been unconstitutional. See
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). Magistrates, however, are compensated by salary and are
provided office space and facilities. 28 U.S.C. § 635 (1970). The increased compensation and
change of title were intended to make the position one to which an attorney would be attracted
on either a part-time or full-time basis. HOUSE REPORT 4254-55.
Magistrates also have expanded jurisdiction over that of the commissioners under the old
system. First, magistrates are given all powers and duties given commissioners by law or by the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(1) (1970). Second, magistrates are
given the power to administer oaths and affirmations, 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(2) (1970), and impose
conditions of release. 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1970). Moreover, magistrates can take acknowledge-
ments, affidavits and depositions, 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(2) (1970), and they can conduct trials of
minor (as opposed to petty) offenses under the limitations of 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (1970) and rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3402 (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(3)
(1970). Finally, magistrates can perform a potentially wide range of additional duties delegated
by district court local rules, none of which could have been assigned to commissioners. Com-
pare 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1970), with Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 916.
2. HOUSE REPORT 4254-55.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(3) (1970) (amended 1976).
4. Id. § 636(a)(2).
5. Id. § 636(b).
6. Id. § 636(a)(1).
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The volume of judicial business handled by magistrates is impressive. At
the close of 1975, 7 the fourth full year of operation, magistrates had disposed
of 255,061 matters.8 Magistrates had conducted 84,505 trial jurisdic-
tion cases, 103,326 preliminary proceedings in criminal cases, and 67,230
additional duties pursuant to section 636(b).9
This article is initially concerned with the 36,766 additional duties that
magistrates have performed in civil proceedings 10 pursuant to section 636(b)
before amendment in October 1976.11 These duties include prisoner peti-
tions,' 2 discovery and pretrial proceedings, 13 references to magistrates as
special masters, 14 and "such additional duties as are not inconsistent with
the Constitution and the laws of the United States."'15 This discussion will
necessarily deal with the implementation of the Act as it stood before the
October 1976 amendments; the expected benefits of the amendments are
examined in Part III.
7. When dealing with statistics, all references to years are federal government fiscal years.
8. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1975 ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR 135 table 2 [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT]. At the close of fiscal year
1975, there were 487 U.S. magistrates: 133 full-time, 337 part-time, and 17 "'combination"
officials. See id. at 133 table 1. A significant number of matters (182,475 or 72% of all matters)
were disposed of by the 111 full-time magistrates on duty during 1975. Id. at 138-39.
9. Id. at 135 table 2. Trial jurisdiction cases include both minor offenses and petty of-
fenses. Preliminary proceedings in criminal cases involve search warrants, arrest warrants, bail
hearings and bail review, preliminary examinations, removal hearings, and probation revocation.
Additional duties in criminal proceedings include post-indictment arraignments, pretrial confer-
ences and omnibus hearings, and motions. Additional duties assigned in civil proceedings in-
volve prisoner petitions, pretrial conferences, motions, special master references and reports,
social security reviews, NARA (title III of Narcotics Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966, 42
U.S.C. §§ 3411-26 (1970)) proceedings, and other matters.
10. ANNUAL REPORT 135 table 2.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1970) provided:
(b) Any district court of the United States, by the concurrence of a majority of all
the judges of such district court, may establish rules pursuant to which any full-time
United States magistrate, or, where there is no full-time magistrate reasonably
available, any part-time magistrate specially designated by the court, may be as-
signed within the territorial jurisdiction of such court such additional duties as are
not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. The additional
duties authorized by rule may include, but are not restricted to-
(1) service as a special master in an appropriate civil action, pursuant to the
applicable provisions of this title and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the
United States district courts;
(2) assistance to a district judge in the conduct of pretrial or discovery proceed-
ings in civil or criminal actions; and
(3) preliminary review of applications for posttrial relief made by individuals
convicted of criminal offenses, and submission of a report and recommendations to
facilitate the decision of the district judge having jurisdiction over the case as to
whether there should be a hearing.
12. 28 U.S.C § 636(b)(3) (1970).
13. Id. § 636(b)(2).
14. Id. § 636(b)(1).
15. Id. § 636CO).
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In its short term of implementation, section 636(b) has been the focus of
much disagreement, lack of consensus, and differing interpretation among
the circuits. The conflict radiates from four general sources. First, the origi-
nal section 636(b) was broadly drafted. It referred to. three illustrative
categories of duties and responsibilities rather than defining exclusive duties
assignable to magistrates.' 6 Second, prisoner petition civil actions in district
courts are a point of irritation among judges generally. The easy access to
federal courts provided by the Habeas Corpus Act 17 and the Civil Rights
Act, 1 8 coupled with the large number of other petitions filed in district
courts each year, crowd the court dockets and make these posttrial petitions
an unpopular civil action.
The well-developed common law on the use of special masters is a third
point of conflict. Some courts, finding it irresistably convenient to equate
magistrates to masters regardless of the nature of the duty delegated, have
proceeded to analyze the magistrates' assignment within the common law
framework of masters' references. Finally, despite the fact that "additional
duties" are to be delegated by local court rule, neither guidelines nor stan-
dards for the promulgation of these local rules have been established. 19
The judicial decisions concerning the civil jurisdiction of magistrates have
moved beyond the question of delegation of judicial power.2 0 Accordingly,
inquiries concerning the manner of delegation, the actual performance of the
duty delegated, and the scope of review to be applied by the judge are the
subjects of this consideration. Magistrate duties, especially review of pris-
oner petitions, service as special master, pretrial and discovery proceedings,
consensual references, and review of administrative determinations, are
analyzed in terms of the existing case law with proposals for improvement.
16. HOUSE REPORT 4262.
17. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1970).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-95 (1970).
19. The Administrative Office of United States Courts has published a jurisdictional
"checklist," but its main purpose is to suggest duties considered appropriate for delegation
rather than to regulate the manner in which the duties are delegated. The checklist is printed
in Hearings on S. 1283 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-26 (1975).
20. The question of the Act's implementation has been the object of some commentary. See,
e.g., Doyle, Implementing the Federal Magistrates Act, 39 J. KAN. B. ASS'N 22 (1970); Peter-
son, The Federal Magistrate's Act: A New Dimension in the Implementation of Justice, 56 IowA
L. REv. 62 (1970). The question of delegation of judicial power has also been addressed. Note,
Masters and Magistrates in the Federal Courts, 88 HARv. L. REv. 779 (1975). See generally
Comment, An Adjudicative Role for Federal Magistrates in Civil Cases, 40 U. CHI. L. REV.
584 (1973). The criminal jurisdiction of magistrates was analyzed in Note, The Validity of United
States Magistrates' Criminal Jurisdiction, 60 VA. L. REv. 697 (1974).
Recently, the Supreme Court has suggested that there was no constitutional question con-
cerning the delegation of duties to magistrates. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976).
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II. PE-AMENDMENT JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF MAGISTRATES' ROLE
A. Prisoner Petitions
The 1970 Federal Magistrates Act suggests that the "preliminary review
of applications for posttrial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal
offenses" is an additional duty assignable to a magistrate. 21 The right of per-
sons to petition for a writ of habeas corpus is embodied in the Constitu-
tion,22 and the jurisdictional provisions for prisoner petitions in federal
courts are found in chapter 153 of Title 28.23 For the purposes of magistrate
duties, approximately two-thirds of the petitions reviewed are filed by con-
victed individuals who allege that they are in federal 24 or state 25 custody in
violation of the "Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States," or in
federal custody 26 under a sentence which is unconstitutional, unlawfil, or
statutorily in excess. 27 Section 2243 of the habeas corpus statute, the basic
procedural provision, delineates a petitioning process that includes issuance
and return of the writ, hearing, and decision by the court. 28 The balance of
prisoner petitions allege civil rights grounds and are generally brought under
section 1983 of the civil rights statute. 29
Although most prisoner petition matters are terminated prior to trial, 30
prisoner petitions consume a significant amount of judicial time and re-
sources in the federal district courts. In fiscal year 1975, 19,307 cases, or
21. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1970).
22. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2.
23. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1970). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(2).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1970).
25. Id. § 2254(a).
26. "[In custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress" is considered
federal custody. Id. § 2255.
27. Id. The petition should be directed to the court that imposed the sentence. The rem-
edies available include vacating, setting aside, or correcting the sentence. Id. Persons under
parole supervision or unconditional release are considered "in custody" and may apply for
habeas corpus writs. See, e.g., Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236(1963) (parole); Carafas v.
LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968) (unconditional release). See generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FED-
ERAL CouRTs § 53 (2d ed. 1970).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1970).
29. Actions seeking declaratory and injunctive relief may be brought under the Civil Rights
Act by prisoners challenging aspects of their confinement which they allege violate their federal
constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Habeas corpus, on the other hand, is a proper
vehicle by which any prisoner, state or federal, may challenge the constitutionality of his con-
finement or actions of prison officials. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974): Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
30. Only 664, or 3.7 percent of the prisoner petition cases terminated in district courts
.during fiscal year 1975, reached trial. ANNUAL REPORT 369 table C-4.
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16.4 percent of all civil cases docketed in district courts, were prisoner peti-
tions. 3 ' Of the 17,976 prisoner petitions terminated in district courts for
1975,32 8,464 were disposed of by magistrates. 33 If the past few years are an
accurate indication, more than one of every five matters disposed of by fed-
eral district courts during fiscal year 1976 will be a prisoner petition. 34
Whether magistrates will continue to perform an active role in the pre-
trial disposition of these matters, and what should be the degree of this
participation, are soon to be resolved questions. The doubt and uncertainty
over the magistrates' function in future prisoner petition matters arise from
the Supreme Court's decision in Wingo v. Wedding.3 5 Mr. Justice Bren-
nan's opinion for the seven justice majority held that section 2243 of the
habeas corpus statute requires an article III judge to conduct all evidentiary
hearings in federal habeas cases36 and that section 636(b)(3) of the Federal
Magistrates Act did not alter that requirement.3 7 Thus, the local rule prom-
ulgated pursuant to section 636(b) by the United States District Court for
the Western District of Kentucky was invalid because it was inconsistent
with the laws of the United States.38 The Chief Justice, with Justice White
concurring, vigorously dissented. Arguing that Congress intended to permit
magistrates to preside over evidentiary hearings in federal habeas corpus
cases, the dissenters concluded that article III was not violated so long as
the district judge retained the power to make the ultimate decision on the
petition. Furthermore, they argued that the majority's decision would only
defeat the fundamental legislative objective of providing "district judges with
more time to devote to the actual trial of cases and the writing of opin-
ions. "3
The Wingo decision is unsatisfactory in three respects. First, Carl James
Wedding, who filed his petition for the writ in 1971, still had no answer to
his petition three years later; he continued to serve a life sentence imposed
after a guilty plea made in 1949.40 Second, Wingo can only add to the con-
fusion that existed among the circuits prior to the decision regarding the role
of magistrates in section 636(b)(3) reviews. 4 ' Third, any anticipated judicial
31. Id. 208 table 25.
32. Id. at 369-70 table C-4.
33. Id. at 502 table M-4.
34. See id. at 208-09 table 25 & graph "Petitions Filed By State and Federal Prisoners."
35. 418 U.S. 461 (1974).
36. Id. at 467-69.
37. Id. at 469-70.
38. Id. at 472. A third part of the Court's holding was that the invalidity of the district
court's local rule was not cured by an electronic recording which had been reviewed by the
district court judge. Id. at 473-74.
39. Id. at 476 (quoting Senator Tydings, sponsor of the enabling legislation).
40. The appellate decision reversed the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. Wedding v. Wingo, 483 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1973), affd, 418 U.S. 461 (1974).
41. See 418 U.S. at 474-75 n.1 Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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economies which were to be derived by injecting federal magistrates into
district court review of prisoner petitions have been severely short-circuited.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court in Wingo relied upon its earlier
holding in Holiday v. Johnson 42 that a district judge must hear the petition-
ing prisoner's testimony in a habeas corpus case and that delegating that
duty to a United States Commissioner was reversible error.4 3 In 1941 when
Holiday was decided, the habeas corpus statute required a "court, or justice,
or judge" to hear the testimony." However, during recodification of the
Judiciary Code in 1948, the procedural provisions of the Habeas Corpus Act
were consolidated in 28 U.S.C. § 2243, to provide that the court should
hold the evidentiary hearing.45 If there were any distinction to be drawn
between "court, or justice, or judge" and "court," Brennan suggested, the
distinction was blunted by subsequent decisions in United States v.
Hayman 46 and Brown v. Allen. 47 The majority opinion therefore held that,
on the basis of section 2243, a federal district judge must hold the eviden-
tiary hearing in a habeas corpus case. 48
42. 313 U.S. 342 (1941).
43. Id. at 350-54.
44. REv. STAT. § 761, formerly 28 U.S.C. § 461 (1940).
45. 28 U.S.C. §. 2243 (1970) provides: "The court shall summarily hear and determine the
facts."
46. 342 U.S. 205 (1952). In the course of its discussion of issue determination by a district
court, the Court in Hayman, citing Holiday with approval, noted that the factual issues were
not to be taken by a commissioner. Id. at 213 n.16.
47. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). The Court in Wingo relied upon the following language from the
Brown decision: "A federal judge on a habeas corpus application is required to 'summarily hear
and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require,' . . . This has
long been the law." Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 469 (1974), quoting Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443, 462 (1953).
48. The majority opinion's analysis was unconvincing in two regards. First, the majority
suggested that the change in statutory language from "court, or justice, or judge" to "court" was
a mere change in form and phraseology. 418 U.S. at 469 n.9. If correct, how can the Court
explain the fact that section 2243, while stating "[t]he court shall summarily hear and determine
the facts," also provides "[a] court, justice, or judge" shall entertain a writ of habeas corpus
application? 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1970) (emphasis added). A uniformity of form argument would
fail.
Second, the habeas corpus chapter is inconsistent throughout with regard to the "court" and
"judge" phraseology. Thus, "'writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any
justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions," 28
U.S.C. § 2241(a) (1970) (emphasis added), could be read to suggest that writs may be granted
by the district court so long as the petitioning prisoner is within the district court's jurisdiction
and that the magistrate, or a judicial officer of the district court, would have the power to grant
wn'ts. See 418 U.S. at 477-78 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1970).
The majority relied on Hayman and Brown, cases decided after revision of the habeas cor-
pus statute, for the proposition that "construction of § 2243 has been that given § 761 in Holi-
day." 418 U.S. at 469. But in Holiday, the Court's interpretation of section 2243 was that fact
finding by a United States commissioner failed to conform to the Habeas Corpus Act. There is
also suppor.for this proposition in Hayman. 342 U.S. 205, 213 & n.16. In Wingo, the Court
[Vol. 27:542
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The Wingo majority also based its conclusion on the section of the Fed-
eral Magistrates Act which provides that a local district court rule may dele-
gate to a magistrate "preliminary review of applications for posttrial relief
. . .and submission of a report and recommendations to facilitate the deci-
sion of the district judge . . . as to whether there should be a hear-
ing. " 49 The Court construed section 636(b) as precluding judges from assign-
ing magistrates the duty of conducting any evidentiary hearings. 50 With re-
gard to habeas corpus proceedings, the Court felt the division of labor was
clear: magistrates "may receive the state court record and all affidavits,
stipulations, and other documents," 5' but a judge must conduct all bear-
ings. Moreover, those cases permitting magistrates to accept oral testimony,
provided certain procedural safeguards were present, were rejected.5 2
The Wingo decision returns the role of magistrates in habeas corpus pro-
ceedings to the pre-Magistrates Act status of commissioner. In habeas corpus
proceedings, the magistrates are to serve as little more than file clerks and
digest writers for federal judges. This result hardly seems to have been the
one intended either by the Federal Magistrates Act or by judicial adminis-
trative legislation in general. The Magistrates Act's jurisdiction and powers
section provides that each magistrate shall have "all powers and duties con-
ferred or imposed upon United States commissioners, '"5 3 plus "such addi-
tional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States."5 4 Moreover, the enumerated additional duties are sugges-
tive, not restrictive.5 5 The Court missed the mark when it precluded magis-
appears to have been randomly casting its net in search of support for its contention that section
2243 requires a district judge to personally conduct any habeas corpus evidentiary hearings. The
Hayman decision clearly was not a good catch.
The reliance on Brown is also questionable. The Court cites language from Brown to sup-
port its theory, 418 U.S. at 469; the language concludes: "This has long been the law." The
Court in Brown, however, was referring to the discretion of district courts "to entertain peti-
tions from state prisoners which raised the same issues raised in the state courts" as the long-
standing rule, and not to the issue of who may hear and determine facts in a habeas corpus
petition. 344 U.S. 443, 462 (1953). The Chief Justice in his dissent properly noted that "Brown
is thus no authority for the proposition that the same limitation Holiday placed on Rev. Stat. §
761 (court, or justice, or judge) applies to §2243 (court) enacted after Holiday." 418 U.S. at
478-79.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1970).
50. 418 U.S. at 472.
51. Id. at 473.
52. Id. at 473 n.19. See text accompanying note 58 infra.
53. 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(1) (1970).
54. Id. § 636(b).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1970) provided: "The additional duties authorized by rule may in-
clude, but are not restricted to-...." (emphasis added). As the House Report clearly states:
Proposed 28 U.S.C. 636(b) mentions three categories of functions assignable to
magistrates under its provisions. The mention of these three categories is intended
to illustrate the general character of duties assignable to magistrates under the act,
rather than to constitute an exclusive specification of duties so assignable.
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trates from holding any evidentiary hearings. The legislation clearly indicates
that the role of the magistrate is to be greater and more inclusive than that
formerly held by commissioners.
The 1970 statute suggests that magistrates review applications, prepare
reports, and make recommendations, 5 6 even though performing these re-
view duties might require a magistrate to hold a preliminary hearing to as-
certain both sides of the applicant's case. Although the ultimate evidentiary
hearing and the ultimate decision would be reserved for, and made by, the
district judge, it is reasonable to conclude that increased responsibility was
especially intended in these suggested areas of additional duties. 57
This approach is substantially that found in the well-reasoned decision of
Senior Judge Aldrich in O'Shea v. United States,58 a pre-Wingo case. As
Judge Aldrich noted, "a magistrate's primary function is not to supplant, but
is to assist judges." 59 Organizing the record of a case, marshalling the argu-
ments on both sides, and presenting a reasoned recommendation to the dis-
trict judge as to whether there should be a hearing cannot be accomplished
within the antiseptic constraints the Wingo decision has imposed upon
magistrates. The view of Senator Tydings, the sponsor of the bill that later
became the Federal Magistrates Act, is in concert with the view suggested
here.60 Moreover, should the district judge decide, following a review of
the magistrate's report and his own review of the record, that a hearing
should be held, there is no reason why the district judge could not employ
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 4262 (emphasis added). This would appear to have been
settled by Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 267 (1976), where the Court stated: "The three
examples § 636(b) sets out are, as the statute itself states, not exclusive."
56. Id. § 636(b)(3).
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)-(3) (1970) (service as special master, pretrial and discovery
proceedings, and posttrial relief applications).
58. 491 F.2d 774 (1st Cir. 1974). The Wingo decision rejected Judge Aldrich's procedural
safeguard of a full trial de novo. See 418 U.S. at 473 n.19.
59. 491 F.2d at 776. The O'Shea opinion described the role a magistrate could play in
habeas corpus proceedings: "[A] magistrate, acting under subsection (3) [28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3)
(1970)], may hold a hearing; he may receive the state court record, and any undisputed docu-
ments the parties care to submit; ... he may receive stipulations.... In addition, he may take
evidence, but with the sole object of leading to findings of fact that all parties accept." 491 F.2d
at 778.
60. Senator Tydings stated:
Our thought was that if a district court were swamped by post-conviction petitions,
it might assign the initial review of them to a magistrate. The magistrate could then
make a preliminary review and a recommendation. The final determination would
have to be made by the judge, but the initial screening could be done by the
magistrate if the court wished.
Hearings on S. 945, H.R. 5502, H.R. 8277, H.R. 8520, H.R. 8932, H.R. 9970, and H.R. 10841




the magistrate's report and research during judicial review of the case.6 '
The Wingo decision also suffers because of the Court's failure to distin-
guish between delegation of a part of the judicial decisionmaking finction
and the retention of the authority to render the ultimate judicial decision.
There is no abdication of judicial power and no violation of the Constitu-
tion 62 when statutorily sanctioned responsibilities are delegated to a lower
tier of judicial officers created to assist in "the expeditious administration of
justice." 63
The impact of the Wingo decision upon the rights of the accused and the
rights of the convicted creates a three-fold irony. First, consider the Court's
decision in Palmore v. United States. 64 In Palmore the Court stated that
"there is no support . . . in either constitutional text or in constitutional
history and practice" for the view that "an Art. III judge must preside over
every proceeding in which a charge, claim, or defense is based on an Act of
Congress or a law made under its authority." 65 When the Palmore and
Wingo decisions are considered together, they indicate than an individual
could be convicted and sentenced for a crime based on an act of Congress in
a proceeding presided over by a nontenured, elected, non-article III judge.
But should this individual subsequently petition the district court, according
to Wingo, an article III judge would be required by law to conduct all hear-
ings.
Second, the irony becomes more acute when it is noted that the Palmore
decision is consistent with the Federal Magistrates Act provision establishing
61. The legislative intent supports this view: "A qualified, experienced magistrate will, it is
hoped, acquire an expertise in examining these [post-conviction review] applications and
summarizing their important contents for the district judge, thereby facilitating his decisions."
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE FEDERAL MACIsTRATEs ACT, REPORT ON S. 945, S.
REP. No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1967).
62. U.S. CONST. art III, § 1. See Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 486 n.11 (1974)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting):
The Court does not suggest that [a magistrate's] conduct of an evidentiary hearing,
where the district judge retains the power to make the final decision on an applica-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus, would be unconstitutional .... Where this situa-
tion obtains, the magistrate's conduct of the hearing would be clearly constitutional.
Id. at 486.
There are certain occasions when a district judge would be constitutionally required to re-
view a matter whether or not the magistrate had reviewed it. The case of McKinney v. Parsons,
488 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1974), was a habeas corpus appeal brought by an individual convicted for
violation of an obscenity ordinance. The per curiam decision stated that personal inspection of
allegedly obscene material was the district judge's "ineluctable duty to do, with or without the
preliminary assistance of the Magistrate." Id. at 453.
63. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 633(c) (1970).
64. 411 U.S. 389 (1973). See Campbell v. United States Dist. Ct., 501 F.2d 196, 201 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974).
65. 411 U.S. at 400. "It was neither the legislative nor judicial view, therefore, that trial
and decision of all federal questions were reserved for Art. III judges." Id. at 402.
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trial jurisdiction of magistrates for "minor offenses." 66 A magistrate has the
jurisdiction and authority to try and convict an individual for commission of
a misdemeanor punishable under the laws of the United States, and he can
imprison this individual for a period of one year or fine him not more than
$1,000, or both. 67 Yet should the convicted misdemeanant apply to a federal
district court for relief from his sentence and/or fine, only a federal district
judge could hear his petition.
Third, the decision in Palmore speaks in terms of a "proceeding in which
a . . .claim . . . is based on an act of Congress." 68 Arguably, an applica-
tion filed for posttrial relief in a federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2243 invokes a civil proceeding in which a claim based upon an act of
Congress is at issue. Were this interpretation of Palmore and habeas corpus
petitions found to be consistent, then the interpretation of the Habeas Cor-
pus Act and the judicial gloss placed upon section 636(b)(3) of the Federal
Magistrates Act would be irreconcilable with the Palmore theory.
In the aftermath of Wingo, there appear to be three separate instances
where an evidentiary hearing conducted by a magistrate in a prisoner peti-
tion action does not require a new evidentiary hearing to be conducted by a
district court judge. The first occasion is not of general application; it is
probably unique to the operative facts of that case. In Rosenfeld v. Rum-
ble,6 9 an officer in the Naval Reserve Medical Corps sought a writ of habeas
corpus to compel his discharge from the Navy as a conscientious objector.
The matter was originally heard by a magistrate, but following the an-
nouncement of the Wingo decision, the district judge felt compelled to make
independent findings. However, because the petitioner was prepared to rest
on the pleadings and record, and because the parties had stipulated that the
record was complete, no new evidentiary hearing was held. 70
The second instance in which evidentiary hearings by a judge were not
required after hearings by a magistrate involved a trilogy of cases in which it
was determined that the.. individuals had never been entitled to any eviden-
tiary hearing. In Willis v. Ciccone,71 a federal prisoner sought a writ of
habeas corpus alleging a denial of various federal rights.72 An evidentiary
66. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(3) (1970); 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (1970).
67. "Minor offenses" are, with certain enumerated exceptions, "misdemeanors punishable
under the laws of the United States, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment for a
period of one year, or a fine of not more than $1,000, or both." 18 U.S.C. §,3401() (1970). The
legislative history indicates that the minor offense jurisdiction was "to give U.S. magistrates
more extensive trial jurisdiction than that [formerly] conferred upon U.S. commissioners," and
was "intended to relieve the U.S. district courts of the burden of trying a considerable number
of minor criminal matters." HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at 4263.
68. 411 U.S. at 400.
69. 386 F. Supp. 476 (D. Mass. 1974).
70. Id. at 477.
71. 506 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1974). Two cases decided with Willis were Proffitt v. Ciccone,
506 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir. 1974), and Frazier v. Ciccone, 506 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 1974).
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hearing was held by the magistrate and the district judge adopted the magis-
trate's findings and recommendation. The prisoner appealed, citing the
magistrate's lack of authority to hold the evidentiary hearing. Following the
announcement of Wingo, the prison-official respondent filed a motion seek-
ing remand for the purpose of a new hearing before a district court
judge. 73 The Court, noting that [a] hearing is not required [for prisoner
petitions] if one is not necessary to a determination on that issue," 74 ruled
that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary to resolve any of the allegations
raised in the case. 75
Finally, a magistrate can hold an evidentiary hearing when a prisoner fash-
ions his complaint as an action for declaratory and injunctive relief under
section 1983 of the civil rights statute, so long as the reference is made to
the magistrate in his capacity as a special master. The Wingo holding, pro-
hibiting magistrates from conducting evidentiary hearings for prisoner peti-
tions under the Habeas Corpus Act,76 was based upon the specific language
of section 2243 of the habeas statute as interpreted in Holiday v.
Johnson .7 7 Therefore, when a prisoner's allegation is actionable under either
the Civil Rights Act or the Habeas Corpus Act, but he chooses to bring his
action under section 1983 of the civil rights statute, Wingo would not pre-
vent a district court judge from referring the action to a magistrate.
This distinction was recognized and sanctioned in Cruz v. Hauck,78 a
section 1983 action brought to prohibit the enforcement of county jail regu-
lations restricting inmates' p9ssession and use of legal materials. The magis-
trate conducted an evidentiary hearing after which he submitted proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court. After affording
the litigants an opportunity to file objections, the district judge adopted the
magistrate's report with slight modifications. The reference was sustained as
one made to a magistrate serving as a special master pursuant to the provi-
sions of Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 79
72. Willis alleged that he was the subject of punitive isolation on the basis of a false disci-
plinary report and an unconstitutional disciplinary hearing, that the disciplinary hearing was
devoid of certain procedural due process safeguards, that he was denied access to the courts, and
that, on the basis of race, his freedom to associate with other prisoners had been abridged. 506
F.2d 1011, 1013 (8th Cir. 1974).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1016.
75. Id. at 1017. The court treated the testimony taken by the magistrate as oral affidavits.
506 F.2d at 1017-18. See also Proffitt v. Ciccone, 506 F.2d 1020, 1021 n.1 (8th Cir. 1974). With
respect to the prisoner's due process and false charges allegations, the court in Willis concluded
that a review of the record of action taken by the prison disciplinary board, along with af-
fidavits, would provide sufficient evidence to determine whether due process had been afforded
in the disciplinary hearings and whether there were facts to support the action taken by prison
officials. Thus there was no necessity for a hearing.
Where infringement of fundamental rights is alleged, the court cautioned that strict judicial
scrutiny is required. Here, because the allegation in the habeas corpus writ did not set forth a
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Because the Cruz decision relied upon Rule 53, rather than the Magis-
trates Act,80 as the source of the district court's power to refer the matter to
the magistrate, it did not definitively state whether a magistrate, pursuant to
a local district court rule promulgated in accordance with section 636(b) of
the Federal Magistrates Act, may hold an evidentiary hearing when a civil
rights prisoner petition is referred to him by a district judge. However,
based on the Court's construction of the specific language of section 2243 of
the habeas corpus statute in Wingo and the Cruz decision, neither the
Magistrates Act nor the Civil Rights Act appear to prevent section 1983
prisoner petitions from being referred to magistrates for evidentiary hear-
ings.
A problem yet to be addressed, and clearly overlooked in the Rosenfeld
case, 8 1 is how to treat habeas corpus and civil rights petitions when filed by
persons who have not been "convicted of criminal offenses' and/or who are
not seeking "posttrial relief." The additional duty suggested by section
636(b)(3) concerns "preliminary review of applications for posttrial relief
made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses." 82 The Wingo decision
applies only to references made pursuant to section 636(b)(3) involving
Habeas Corpus Act petitions. 83 There are many habeas corpus actions, such
claim as a matter of law, no evidentiary hearing was necessary. 506 F.2d at 1019. See also
Proffitt v. Ciccone, 506 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir. 1974).
76. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2243-55 (1970).
77. 313 U.S. 342 (1941). In Holiday, the Court was actually interpreting the language in 28
U.S.C. § 461 (1940), which was later combined with other sections to form 28 U.S.C. § 2243
(1970).
78. 515 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1975). See also Bel v. Hall, 392 F. Supp. 274 (D. Mass. 1975),
discussed in text accompanying note 106 infra..
79. 515 F.2d at 327. This would clearly fit within the illustrative reference suggested in the
Federal Magistrates Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1970). The district court judge referred the
matter to the magistrate pursuant to an order authorizing magistrates to perform certain duties
in criminal actions. 515 F.2d at 326. Because the district judge directed that the proceedings be
conducted pursuant to Rule 53, the court treated the reference "as though ordered pursuant to
Rule 53." 515 F.2d at 327.
The Cruz decision does not explicitly approve of a magistrate qua magistrate conducting an
evidentiary hearing in a prisoner's civil rights action, but it does sustain a reference to a magis-
trate in his capacity as a special master. The court noted:
[The instant reference was not ordered pursuant to an applicable rule adopted
under the Federal Magistrates Act; therefore, the Act may not be used to sustain
the reference. The sole source of power for this reference is Rule 53 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Id. at 326 n.3. Whether an additional duty assigned to a magistrate should be governed by Rule
53 and its case law, or by a more expansive standard implied under the Magistrates Act, is the
subject matter of the next section. It is enough for the present to state that the area is riddled
with confusion.
80. 515 F.2d at 326 n.3. See note 79 supra.
81. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
82. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1970).
83. 515 F.2d at 326 n.5.
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as the discharge from active naval duty sought in the Rosenfeld case, 84 that
do not involve posttrial relief for convicted individuals. If reference to a
magistrate in a habeas corpus action is not made pursuant to section
636(b)(3), is the magistrate still prohibited from conducting an evidentiary
hearing because, as the Wingo decision would seem to insist, all evidentiary
hearings in habeas corpus actions must be conducted by a judge? Or does
the Wingo prohibition operate only where one finds the nexus of a habeas
corpus action and a reference to a magistrate pursuant to section 636(b)(3)
specifically involving posttrial relief? Would reference of a habeas corpus
action to a magistrate who served as a Rule 53 special master 85 overcome
the Wingo prohibition?
Cruz and Wingo also leave unanswered questions in the area of civil
rights actions for declaratory and injunctive relief, whether brought by con-
victed persons seeking posttrial relief or otherwise. May these actions be
referred to a federal magistrate with power to conduct evidentiary hearings,
or would this only be possible if the reference to the magistrate were made
pursuant to Rule 53, as was the case in Cruz? Could the referral occur
pursuant to a rule adopted under the Federal Magistrates Act? If the rule
cannot be promulgated pursuant to section 636(b)(3), section 636(b)(1) may
grant the appropriate authority.
The case law presently provides some answers to these questions of
magistrates' jurisdiction. For example, on the basis of Wingo, a magistrate
may review any petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to section
2243, whether filed for posttrial relief or otherwise, but he cannot conduct
an evidentiary hearing as a part of his review. This applies regardless of
whether the habeas corpus petition seeks posttrial relief and the reference is
made pursuant to section 636(b)(3), or whether the habeas corpus petition is
based upon any other proper ground for the extraordinary relief, and the
reference is made pursuant to any local district court rule promulgated
under the authority of the Magistrates Act. It is settled that "[i]t was the
Court's reading of the habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2243, that formed
the basis for the holding in Wingo v. Wedding." 86
The Cruz decision defines another aspect of a magistrate's jurisdiction.
The decision stands as well-reasoned authority for permitting a magistrate to
conduct an evidentiary hearing when a prisoner fashions his petition for
posttrial relief as an injunctive and declaratory action brought pursuant to
section 1983 of the civil rights statute, when the matter is referred to the
magistrate in his capacity as a master. The reasoning of Cruz and Wingo,
taken together, should permit a magistrate to conduct an evidentiary hearing'
84. 386 F. Supp. 476 (D. Mass. 1974).
85. Cf. Cruz v. Hauck, 515 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1975).
86. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 275 (1976).
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in a civil rights petition so long as the statute does not specifically require a
judge-which it presently does not-and the local district court rule is prop-
erly drafted to authorize the delegated duty. 87
B. The Other Additional Duties
The remaining duties which a magistrate may be assigned in civil pro-
ceedings arise from three overlapping grants of authority to district courts. A
magistrate may be directed by Rule 53 to serve as a special master, 88 he
may assist in conducting pretrial or discovery proceedings, 9 or he may per-
form "such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States." 90
A great deal of confision has ernpted over the assignment of magistrates
to perform these duties. Some decisions have ignored the legislative intent
of the Magistrates Act, while others have demonstrated a parochial dedica-
tion to the special masters rule and an improper equation of magistrates to
masters that has limited the reference of matters to exceptional cases. 91 As a
reaction to these decisions, the Judicial Conference and the Congress have
begun to take steps to rectify the problems. The following sections examine
the case law that has developed in the area of additional duties in civil pro-
ceedings.
1. Service as Special Master
Matters are often referred to special masters in an attempt to lighten the
judges' workload by enabling a lower judicial officer to perform certain
ministerial acts of the court. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 governs the
appointment of, and reference of matters to, special masters in civil cases.
The rule's origin can be found in several of the Federal Equity Rules of
87. Part III of this article examines legislative and rulemaking changes that would clarify
and make uniform the treatment of prisoner petitions by federal district courts, regardless of the
statutory basis of the petition. Because so many prisoner petition actions are terminated prior to
trial, see note 30 supra, the pretrial disposition of the petitions warrants attention and standard-
.ization.
88. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1970).
89. Id. § 636(b)(2).
90. Id. § 636(b).
91. Rule 53(b) provides: "A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule."
FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b).
In Ingram v. Richardson, 471 F.2d 1268 (6th Cir. 1972), the Sixth Circuit wrongly applied a
special master analysis in determining - that reference of a social security disability benefits
matter was improper. See discussion of Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976), in text accom-
panying note 160 infra.
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1912.92 The role of a master was early characterized by the Supreme Court:
"A master in chancery is an officer appointed by the court to assist it in
various proceedings incidental to the progress of a cause before it."9 3
The nile distinguishes the role of masters between jury and non-jury
proceedings,94 but provides in all cases that "reference to a master shall be
the exception and not the rule."
The Federal Magistrates Act specifically provides that a magistrate may
serve as a special master.95 A close reading of the Act suggests that a magis-
trate could only serve as a special master if the duty were delegated by a
district judge pursuant to a local district court rile,16 but it is clear from
several cases, including Cruz v. Hauck,9 7 that Rule 53 provides an indepen-
dent basis for appointment of a magistrate as special master, so long as the
delegation itself is "not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States." 98
Appointment of magistrates as special masters would overcome several
disadvantages associated with references to special masters. First, neither
party would have to bear the cost of compensating the magistrate for service
as master. Thus, a burdensome and inequitable barrier to appointment of
special masters under rule 53(a) would be removed by the use of magis-
trates.9 9 Second, the delay frequently experienced when matters were re-
ferred to any master 100 "well versed in the law and fit to perform the
92. See Equity R. 49, 51 (Evidence Taken Before Examiners, etc.), 52 (Attendance of Wit-
nesses Before Commissioners, Master, or Examiner), 59 (Reference to Master-Exceptional, not
Usual), 60 (Proceedings Before Master), 61 (Master's Report-Documents Identified But Not
Set Forth), 61V (Master's Report-Presumptions as to-How Reviewed), 62 (Powers of Master),
65 (Claimants Before Master Examinable by Him), 66 (Return of Master's Report-
Exceptions-Hearing), and 68 (Appointment and Compensation of Masters), 226 U.S. 657
(1912), as amended, 286 U.S. 570 (1932).
93. Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512, 523 (1889).
94. Rule 53(b) provides: "In actions to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only
when the issues are complicated; in actions to be tried without a jury, save in matters of
account and of difficult computation of damages, a reference shall be made only upon a showing
that some exceptional condition requires it." FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b).
95. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1970). For a discussion of the constitutional basis of delegation of
judicial power to magistrates, see Note, Masters and Magistrates in the Federal Courts, 88
HAnv. L. REv. 779, 780-89 (1975).
96. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1970) provides that "[t]he additional duties authorized by rule may
include . . . (1) service as a special master" (emphasis added).
97. 515 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1975). See text at note 78 supra.
98. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1970). See Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 507 F.2d 1378 (7th
Cir. 1974), and text accompanying note 117 infra. See also Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461
(1974).
99. Rule 53(a) provides: "'The compensation to be allowed to a master... shall be charged
upon such of the parties or paid out of any fund or subject matter of the action ... as the court
may direct." FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a). See Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58
COLUm. L. REv. 452 n.4 (1958).
100. A. VANDERBILT, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS IN MODERN PROCEDURE AND JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION 1240-41 (1952).
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duties," 101 would be overcome by appointment of a magistrate as master,
because magistrates are restricted with respect to any outside occupation or
business.' 0 2 Finally, any apparent or real conflict that might be present with
a regular master because of involvement in the case or conflicting outside
interests would be overcome by having a magistrate, a judicial officer
employed by the court, serve as master. 10 3
There are several types of civil actions for which utilization of magistrates
as special masters has been judicially approved. Actions for declaratory and
injunctive relief brought under the Cvil Rights Act by prisoners have been
referred to magistrates for evidentiary hearings and reports. In Cruz v.
Hauck,10 4 the district court referred the county jail inmates' action against
enforcement of jail regulations to a magistrate who functioned as a special
master. The magistrate conducted evidentiary hearings and filed a report
which was adopted, with minor modifications, by the district judge.' 0 5
Bel v. Hall,10 6 decided a few months prior to Cruz, approved the prac-
tice of referring civil rights prisoner petitions to magistrates as masters. In
this district court decision, the judge adopted the report of the magistrate
sitting as special master, and remanded the case to the magistrate for con-
sideration of remedial proposals.
While the Supreme Court has not specifically decided a case concerning
reference of a civil rights petition to a magistrate serving as a master, the
Chief Justice favors such a practice. Chief Justice Burger has argued that
"federal judges should consider referring . . .civil rights cases brought by
prisoners for preliminary consideration by a United States magistrate sitting
as a special master and reporting to the Court."'1 7 As analogous authority,
Chief Justice Burger pointed to the use of special masters by the Supreme
Court in original jurisdiction disputes between states. In those cases, the
Court "regularly designate[s] special masters to take all the evidence and
recommend the disposition of multimillion dollar litigation."' 0 8
101. 5A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 53.03, at 2922 (2d ed. 1975).
102. "Full-time United States magistrates may not engage in the practice of law, and may not
engage in any other business, occupation, or employment inconsistent with the expeditious,
proper, and impartial performance of their duties as judicial officers. 28 U.S.C. § 632(a) (1970).
Part-time magistrates are similarly restricted when serving as judicial officers. 28 U.S.C. §
632(b) (1970). Cf. Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 507 F.2d 1378, 1379 (7th Cir. 1974).
103. Cf. United States v. O'Connor, 291 F.2d 520, 526 (2d Cir. 1961).
104. 515 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1975). See text accompanying note 78 supra.
105. The court of appeals did not specifically sanction the reference, stating it "need not
consider whether the district judge acted improperly in making the reference for we believe
that appellants have waived their right to object." 515 F.2d at 326. Another reason for not
specifically approving the reference was that the judgment was vacated and the case
remanded-for the third time-on other grounds. Nonetheless, the court spent several pages
discussing judicial references to magistrates, leaving the impression that it would have decided,
if required to, that the reference was proper. See 515 F.2d at 326-331.
106. 392 F. Supp. 274 (D. Mass. 1975).




A second area where utilizing magistrates as masters to assist judges has
received judicial approval is in the disposition of preliminary injunction ac-
tions. In CAB v. Carefree Travel, Inc.,10 9 the Civil Aeronautics Board
brought an action against fourteen corporations and nineteen i.dividuals to
enjoin certain "black market" charter flights. The district court referred the
matter to the magistrate as master who made initial findings in connection
with a preliminary injunction. The order of reference was made by the court
pursuant to a local court rule promulgated under the authority of Rule
53(b) 110 and section 636(b)(1) of the Magistrates Act. The Second Circuit
found several grounds upon which to hold the reference proper. First, the
reference was not for the entire case but for the limited purpose of making
initial findings in connection with a preliminary injunction, subject to the
district judge's examination and further review. Therefore, there was no ab-
dication of judicial decisionmaking."'1 Second, the proceedings had been
complicated by the large number of parties and their individual motions.
Delegating one aspect of the proceeding would serve "to aid [the] judge in
the performance of specific judicial duties, as they [might] arise in the prog-
ress of a cause." 112 Third, reference to the magistrate as master served the
public interest in prompt determination of preliminary injunction questions.
Finally, the appeals court found the reference to have been made under
"exceptional circumstances," and therefore properly within Rule 53(b).11 3
Masters traditionally have been assigned "matters of account and of dif-
ficult computation of damages." 114 In two Sixth Circuit Title VII cases,
computation of back pay was referred to a magistrate as special master. In
Thornton v. East Texas Motor Freight,1 5 the trial court determined that
109. 513 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1975).
110. Id. at 378 n.1. "By order dated April 20, 1971, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York authorized magistrates to perform all additional duties permitted
by statute. General Rule 25.1." Id. at 379 n.3.
111. See LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957); cf. 28 C.F.R. § 50.11 (1975).
In Reed v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 459 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1972), a motion for provi-
sional voter registration of students was approved by the district court on the basis of a magis-
trate's order. Because the court rendered its final judgment without reviewing the over 100
pages of testimony, the First Circuit determined that this was "an abnegation of judicial author-
ity by the court entirely contrary to the provisions of Article III. The extent to which even
preliminary injunctions should be passed on in this manner deserves very careful consideration
at some future date." Id. at 123.
The Carefree Travel decision established the standard for "very careful consideration" of
preliminary injunction cases. It was recently cited with approval by the Supreme Court in
Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 274 n.9 (1976).
112. 513 F.2d 375, 382 (2d Cir. 1975), quoting Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920).
113. 513 F.2d at 383.
114. FED. R. CIv. P. 53(b).
115. 497 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1974). See also United States v. Masonry Contractors Ass'n. of
Memphis, Inc., 497 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1974). Both decisions are Title VII cases alleging dis-
criminatory employment practices in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e et seq. (1970).
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back pay should be awarded; then, prior to referring the matter to the
magistrate, it established a flexible standard for the magistrate to apply in
computing the back pay awards. Thus only after all of the Title VII substan-
tive matters had been determined by the judge was the case referred to the
magistrate serving as master."16 The appellate court approved this proce-
dure.
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp.,"17
on the other hand, limited the use of reference to a magistrate as master in
Title VII actions. The procedure followed in the district court was particu-
larly offensive to the letter and spirit of Title VII and Rule 53 because the
court clerk, rather than the chief judge of the district, assigned the case to a
magistrate, not to a judge. Applying the restrictive Wingo analysis to Title
VII, the Seventh Circuit held that the local rule" 8 requiring the district
court clerk to assign all civil rights employment discrimination cases to
magistrates was invalid because it was inconsistent with the Title VII provi-
sion"19 requiring the chief judge of each district to immediately assign each
pending Title VII case to a judge in the district. It was not until after the
magistrate had conducted pretrial conferences, supervised discovery, and re-
ceived status reports that the clerk referred the case to a district judge. Soon
thereafter, the judge referred the case back to the magistrate for firther
conferences and a final pretrial order. This procedure clearly violated Title
VII.12O The case was returned to the judge, who, "using a standard form
and without purporting in any way to exercise a discriminating judgment
with respect to this particular case,''2 ordered that in compliance with the
116. 497 F.2d at 421-22. The same procedure was followed by the district court and affirmed
with approval in United States v. Masonry Contractors Ass'n, 497 F.2d 871, 876 (6th Cir. 1974).
117. 507 F.2d 1378 (7th Cir. 1974).
118. Local Magistrates Rule l(D)(2)(b)(i) of the Northern District of Illinois provides:
D. Pursuant to section 636(b), Title 28, United States Code, each full-time magis-
trate is assigned and shall perform the following additional duties anywhere in this
district and for those purposes is hereby granted the following plenary powers:
(2) Civil Proceedings
(b) to consider all motions and, where appropriate, [prepare] findings of fact
and proposed conclusions of law in the following nonjury matters:
(i) Actions brought under Title VII
appearing in 507 F.2d at 1379.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(0(4) (1970), requires the chief judge of the district to "designate a
judge in such district to hear and determine the case." The only exception is found in 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(0(5) (1970), which permits appointment of a master pursuant to Rule 53 if the
designated judge "has not scheduled the case for trial within one hundred and twenty days after
issue has been joined."
120. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(0(4) (1970).




one hundred and twenty day restriction in Title VII,12 2 the case be referred
to the magistrate as a master for preparation of a report, including findings
of fact and conclusions of law. The magistrate's report was upheld "in all
essential respects" by the district judge when he entered judgment.12 3 In
sum, the magistrate had not served to assist the judge, he had supplanted
him. 1 2 4
In TPO, Inc. v. McMillen,125 an earlier Seventh Circuit case, the prac-
tice of referring motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment to
magistrates was considered. The court concluded that the magistrate did not
have the power to decide such motions because they involved decisionmak-
ing that should be reserved to article III judges. Because such delegation by
the district court was inconsistent with the Constitution, the Federal Magis-
trates Act could not be a source of that power.126
In cases like Flowers and more specifically TPO, it appeared that there
was "an increasing use by district judges of special masters for purposes
involving the abdication of judicial decision making authority forbidden by
the Constitution or in contravention of Rule 53(b)." In response to this per-
ception, then Acting Attorney General Bork ordered all Department of Jus-
tice attorneys "not to agree to the designation of a Magistrate as a special
master whenever they conclude that such designation would be in contra-
vention of the Constitution or Rule 53(b)." 127 Barely a month after the
122. 42 U.S.C. § 20 00e-5(f)(5) (1970).
123. 507 F.2d at 1379.
124. See O'Shea v. United States, 491 F.2d 774, 776 (1st Cir. 1974).
A related area in which magistrates have also been utilized as masters is in actions arising
under the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. (1970). In City of Richmond v. United
States, 376 F. Supp. 1344 (D.D.C. 1974), the city of Richmond sought a declaration, as required
by 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970), that its annexation of certain land neither intended to nor in fact
would deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race or color. The court referred the case
to a magistrate, pursuant to Rule 53, who heard testimony as to whether the plan of annexation
would dilute the black vote. On the basis of the magistrate's findings that the city had failed to
meet its burden of disproving any discriminatory purpose or effect, the court declined to grant
declaratory relief.
On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded. 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
In concluding that further proceedings were necessary to update and reassess the evidence, the
Court discussed the role of the master in such proceedings, leaving the clear implication that the
reference to the master was permissible practice. 422 U.S. at 372-79. Moreover, the dissent
also implicitly approved of the reference to a master. 422 U.S. at 384. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125. 460 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1972). The TPO decision is invaluable for its discussion of the
relevant legislative history of the Magistrates Act.
126. 460 F.2d at 359. The court, quoting from the Senate report that accompanied passage of
the Magistrates Act, S. REP. No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-26 (1967), stated that section
636(b) does not permit the " 'abdication of the decisionmaking responsibility' of district courts,"
and " 'cannot be read in derogation of the fundamental responsibility of judges to decide the
cases before them'." 460 F.2d at 359 & n. 57.
127. 28 C.F.R. § 50.11 (1975). The order also suggests that where necessary, relief by appli-
cation for a writ of mandamus could be sought from appellate courts.
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promulgation of the regulation, Judge Frankel, in United States v. East-
mount Shipping Corp.,12 8 presided over an action by the United States
against a carrier for alleged cargo damage. The Department of Justice attor-
ney opposed the designation of a magistrate to serve as a master in the case.
Although recognizing the innovative spirit of the Magistrates Act, Judge
Frankel reluctantly concluded that "the court accepts the position . . . that
a reference to one of our distinguished Magistrates of [a] claim for
$10,010.47 would, as the law now stands, be an impermissible 'abdication of
judicial decisionmaking powers.' " 129
On the basis of the decisions involving magistrates serving as special
masters, it appears settled that magistrates may be delegated the duties of a
special master either pursuant to a local district court rule promulgated
under authority of section 636(b)(1), or pursuant to Rule 53. In either case,
the delegation cannot be inconsistent with a law of the United States-as
was the case in Flowers--or inconsistent with the Constitution-as in TPO.
Finally, in either form of delegation, when a magistrate serves as a special
master in a civil action, he must perform only those tasks traditionally per-
mitted by Rule 53.130
2. Pretrial and Discovery Proceedings
Section 636(b)(2) suggests that magistrates may be delegated duties that
assist district judges in the conduct of pretrial or discovery proceedings. Of
128. 62 F.R.D. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
129. Id. at 441. But see Kliban v. United States, 65 F.R.D. 6 (D. Conn. 1974). Judge Fran-
kel's opinion in Eastmount spoke very highly of the potential of the Magistrate's Act and of his
district's magistrates: "The five magistrates serving in this court have performed a valuable array
of services in the management of pretrial and other aspects of our proceedings." 62 F.R.D. at
438.
130. In this respect, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the principles regarding references
to masters set forth in LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957), still apply whenever
the reference is made pursuant to Rule 53. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 273 (1976).
In two cases that postdate the promulgation of 28 C.F.R. § 50.11 (1975), courts have refused
to grant writs of mandamus to vacate references to magistrates as masters. In Vickers Motors,
Inc. v. Wellford, 502 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1974), the private-party defendant was denied the
mandamus writ he had sought after the district judge referred discovery motions to a magistrate
for a hearing and recommendation. In Chicago Housing Authority v. Austin, 511 F.2d 82 (7th
Cir. 1975), the &ity housing authority sought mandamus to vacate the district judge's order
referring proceedings to review implementation of an order to desegregate housing where there
had been a five-year delay in compliance. In both cases, the appellate courts determined that
there had been no abdication of the ultimate decisionmaking and that if the challenged order or
reference were erroneous or prejudicial, appeal would provide an adequate remedy. However,
in TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348 (6th Cir. 1972) (decided prior to issuance of 28 C.F.R.
§ 50.11 (1975)), the court of appeals issued the writ, holding that the district judge had dele-
gated ultimate decisionmaking duties to the magistrate by permitting the magistrate to decide
motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment. With regard to these duties see discus-
sion of "dispositive" matters in Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577, 90 Stat. 2729, re-
printed at note 174 infra.
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the various 36,766 additional duties assigned to magistrates in civil actions
during fiscal 1975, magistrates conducted 17,776 civil pretrial conferences
and reviewed 7,938 discovery and other motions in civil cases.' 3 1 Despite
the significant degree of participation by magistrates in these matters, there
have been only a handful of cases involving magistrates and discovery or
pretrial procedures. However, this is explainable by the limited number of
conflicts that arise in this area; discovery and pretrial proceedings usually
involve nonappealable orders that can be resolved by the district judge prior
to or at trial.
Kliban v. United States' 32 is the only significant case decided squarely on
the authority of section 636(b)(2). 133 In this action for refund of estate taxes,
the parties stipulated to the facts and filed cross-motions for summary judg-
ment. The motions and briefs were referred to the magistrate for his "initial
review, hearing of any requested oral argument and submission of a recom-
mended memorandum ruling for adoption, modificatiorr or rejection" pur-
suant to a local court rule. 134 The government attorney objected to the re-
ferral, citing the Department of Justice directive, 135 and challenged the
court's authority to utilize a magistrate as a master for this purpose.
The Kliban court's response provided a thorough and much-needed
analysis. First, the court noted that the summary judgment motions had not
been referred to the magistrate in his capacity as special master, but to a
magistrate qua magistrate in accordance with section 636(b)(2) and a local
district court rule. 136 The court condemned the narrowness of the govern-
131. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 135 table 2.
132. 65 F.R.D. 6 (D. Conn. 1974). See Remington Arms Co. v. United States, 461 F.2d 1268
(2d Cir. 1972), affirming the district court's approval and adoption of the magistrate's recom-
mendation to grant plaintiffs summary judgment motion in an excise tax refund case.
An example of the high esteem in which a magistrate can be held by his district court
and its bar can be found in these Connecticut, Second Circuit cases, all involving the same
magistrate, and all approving his actions. See, e.g., Kliban v. United States, 65 F.R.D. 6, 7 (D.
Conn. 1974); Remington Arms Co. v. United States, 461 F.2d 1268 (2d Cir. 1972); Givens v.
W.T. Grant Co., 457 F.2d 612, 613 & n.1 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
409 U.S. 56 (1972); Asparro v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 1085, 1086 (D. Conn. 1973).
133. There have been several cases concerning referral of evidentiary hearings to magistratei
on motions to suppress evidence in criminal cases. The foremost case is Campbell v. United
States Dist. Ct., 501 F.2d 196 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974), in which the court
held that a magistrate could preside over such evidentiary hearings, make proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law, and present them along with a proposed order to the district court.
Unlike the Supreme Court's conclusion in Wingo, discussed at notes 35-57 supra and accom-
panying text, the court found no requirement in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that a
judge conduct such hearings. The court also stated that if the magistrate's factual findings were
challenged, a de novo review by the judge would be required. See also United States v. Berg-
era, 512 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Belculfine, 508 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1974);
United States v. Ciovacco, 384 F. Supp. 1385 (D. Mass. 1974).
134. 65 F.R.D. 6, 7 (D. Conn. 1974). The local rule is quoted at 65 F.R.D. at 8-9.
135. 28 C.F.R. § 50.11 (1975).
136. In Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 273 (1976), the Court stated: "[N]ot every refer-
ence, for whatever purpose, is to be characterized as a reference to a special master."
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ment's approach, observing that it was clearly contemplated by the statute
that magistrates would provide "assistance to a district judge in the conduct
of pretrial or discovery proceedings.- 1 3 7 Second, there was no judicial abdi-
cation. The final decision on the motions was wholly reserved to the judge
following review of the magistrate's report and recommendation. Moreover,
even after reaching his decision, the judge would entertain requests for re-
consideration unless previously waived.
The principle that emerges from the Kliban decision is important in sev-
eral respects. When a reference is made to a magistrate qua magistrate,
rather than to a magistrate as a special master, the restrictions that attach to
Rule 53 referrals do not apply. Given the large number of discovery, pre-
trial, and preliminary motion matters that are annually disposed of by magis-
trates and the paucity of judicial decisions, it is reasonable to conclude that
magistrates are being well utilized in this area. The Kliban decision, in rec-
ognition of these facts, allows magistrates to continue functioning in these
areas pursuant to local district court rules.' 3 8 Finally, the decision in Kliban
reemphasizes that subsections (1)-(3) of section 636(b) are merely illustrative
of the wide range of duties which may be delegated. 139 Two such additional
duties, consensual references and review of appeals from administrative
agency orders, have received judicial review.
3. Consensual References
As the plain meaning of the statute, its legislative history, and its judicial
interpretation make clear, the three magisterial duties noted in section
636(b) are illustrative rather than exhaustive. Too much litigation has been
wasted trying to fit a particular task performed by a magistrate within one of
the three subsections. The central thrust of section 636(b) is that district
courts, by promulgating local court rules, may delegate any additional duty
to a magistrate which is not offensive to the Constitution or the federal laws.
The purpose behind the Magistrates Act was to create a new tier of judi-
cial officers 140 which would "provide district Judges with more time to de-
vote to the actual trial of cases and the writing of opinions.' 14 1 This would
137. 65 F.R.D. at 8, quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) (1970). The court stated that "[t]he Act
has plainly created a new judicial officer of potentially far greater utility than the former master
intermittently drawn from the bar for special service in the extraordinary case. Accordingly, this
Court's implementation of the statute has been governed by considerations of practical sub-
stance to the extent 'not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States'."
65 F.R.D. at 8.
138. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1970).
139. 65 F.R.D. at 8. In Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976), the Court stated that the
"three examples § 636(b) sets out are ... not exclusive." Id. at 267. See note 55 supra. See also
Hearings on the Federal Magistrates Act Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1968) (testimony of bill sponsor Senator Tydings).
140. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 4257.
141. Hearings on S. 3475 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966).
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be accomplished if the district judges were "willing to experiment with the
assignment to magistrates of other functions."' 42 It was hoped that the
judges would be "innovative" and "imaginative," and not merely assign to
magistrates the three suggested duties.of section 636(b). It was foreseen that
judges would utilize magistrates "in these areas and perhaps even come up
with new areas to increase the efficiency of their courts.' 143
The First Circuit, in DeCosta v. CBS, 44 discussed and approved a pro-
cedure for consensual reference by parties of certain matters to magistrates.
The DeCosta case is part of a twelve year trademark, service mark, and
unfair competition suit concerning allegedly unauthorized use of the Paladin
character and "Have Gun Will Travel" slogan. In this trial, the parties stipu-
lated that certain counts be determined on the basis of the trial transcript
and additional testimony. The matter was referred to a magistrate who took
testimony and reported his findings of fact and conclusions of law. Only then
did thd defendants object to the reference, arguing that the reference and
the magistrate's recommendation sustaining the plaintiff's position were
ultra vires. On the basis of the Magistrates Act and Kimberly v. Arms,145
the district court ruled that the delegation did not contravene the Constitu-
tion and that the magistrate's exercise of jurisdiction was legitimate. It con-
cluded that a consensual reference to a magistrate was not a reference to a
special master pursuant to section 636(b)(1). 146 On appeal, the First Circuit
decided that it was "constitutionally and statutorily permissible to refer
cases, with the consent of all parties, for intitial decision" by a magistrate. 14 7
The court also affirmed that the cross-motions were not made to the magis-
trate as a master, but were referred to the magistrate qua magistrate as an
additional duty.
142. S. REP. No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1967).
143. Hearings on S. 945 before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 17, at 81 (1968).
144. 520 F.2d 499 (1st Cir. 1975), rev'g on other grounds 383 F. Supp. 326 (D.R.I. 1974).
For an analysis of the DeCosta decision, see Note, Federal Magistrates and the Implications of
Consensual References, 4 FoaRDHr UB. L.J. 129, 137-39, 142-45 (1975).
145. 129 U.S. 512 (1889). In Kimberly, a consensual reference to a non-article III officer was
considered constitutional and not an abdication of power by the article III judge so long as the
determination of the non-article III officer was subject to the judge's review.
146. 383 F. Supp. 326, 337 (D.R.I. 1974). The court of appeals reversed that part of the
DeCosta decision dealing with the standard of review to be employed by the judge. The district
court relied on the standards set forth in Kimberly: the magistrate's report was "presumptively
correct" and would only be reversed if there were "manifest error." Id. at 336-39. The court of
appeals suggested that a more appropriate standard of review would be that found in Rule 52(a)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It found the district court's failure to review the
magistrate's report under Rule 53(a) and to employ the "clearly erroneous" standard of Rule
52(a) was itself erroneous. 520 F.2d 499, 508-09 (1st Cir. 1975).
147. 520 F.2d at 507-08. This obviously meets the basic requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)
(1970).
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Viewing the magistrate as an article I judge14 8 appointed pursuant to
constitutionally granted cong:essional power,' 49 the First Circuit Court of
Appeals reviewed the authority for consensual references to non-article III
officers once a court proceeding has begun. In an early Supreme Court deci-
sion, Heckers v. Fowler,'5 0 a consensual reference was determined to be
"one of the modes of prosecuting a suit to judgment as well established and
as fully warranted by law as a trial by jury."' 15' Unlike the situation in
Labuy v. Howes Leather Co.,' 5 2 where there was wholesale reference of a
complex antitrust suit to a private master despite objections on all sides, a
consensual reference by definition would involve a mutual decision by both
parties to agree to another arbiter. Comparing consensual reference to a
magistrate with an agreement to arbitrate a future dispute, the DeCosta
court noted that in a consensual reference the parties were able to make a
more informed choice to waive their access to an article III judge because
the issues of their dispute were already defined. 153
Finally, the court decided that Congress had considered consensual ref-
erences an additional magisterial duty when the Act was passed. As an early
Senate staff memorandum noted: "The use of magistrates for duties that do
not require the employment of an Article III judge, or in cases in which
parties consent to the use of a magistrate, may do much to increase the
efficiency of the Federal Courts."'154
The DeCosta decisions and analyses go a long way towards fully imple-
menting the Federal Magistrates Act. A previously lurking, often suggested
but never fully pronounced notion was articulated in these well-reasoned
decisions: a magistrate may be delegated, pursuant to local district court
rules, any additional duty that all parties to a civil suit mutually consent to
have the magistrate perform, so long as the duty is permitted by the Con-
stitution, not violative of any federal law, and the referring judge retains the
power to review, and to adopt, modify, or reject the magistrate's determina-
tion.'3 5 District courts should utilize magistrates to a much greater degree
148. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543, 552 (1962)
149. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
150. 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 123 (1864).
151. Id. at 128-29, quoted in 520 F.2d at 504. See also Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512, 524
(1889).
152. 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
153. The court noted that the goal of arbitration and consensual reference was the same:
"relieving scarce judicial resources and . . . accommodating the parties." 520 F.2d at 505. Cer-
tainly the former, if not the latter, is a goal of the Federal Magistrates Act. See Hearing on S.
3475 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., gd Sess. (1966) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
154. Hearings, supra note 153, at 14.
155. The First Circuit's decision noted that the "issue is not the power of the judge to refer,
but the power of the parties to agree to another arbiter, absent overriding constitutional consid-
erations." 520 F.2d at 504.
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through the consensual reference technique, a method which would effec-
tively provide district judges with more time to hear trials and write opin-
ions.
4. Review of Administrative Determinations: Social Security Appeals
At the opposite end of the spectrum from consensual reference is refer-
ence ordered by a district judge sua sponte. Many matters now come before
the federal district courts as appeals on the record from administrative agen-
cies. This area presents an excellent but largely untapped opportunity for
district judges to utilize non-article III judicial officers. The role of district
courts in these cases typically involves a review of the agency's legal conclu-
sions and a determination of whether the record contains substantial evi-
dence to support the contested finding.' 56 There are no de novo evidentiary
hearings involved. Magistrates could be used to review and summarize the
record (which is often massive) and make a recommendation for disposition
of such appeals either as special masters under section 636(b)(1) or as magis-
trates qua magistrates pursuant to section 636(b)(2).
Social security benefit cases constitute a large and constantly growing
area of federal district courts' appellate jurisdiction.' 5 7 Since 1968, social
security cases have increased almost 400 percent; from 1974 to 1975 alone,
the increase was 63 percent.' 5 8 The Social Security Act provides for review
of the Secretary's final determination by a district court on the basis of the
pleadings and the administrative record, but the court must accept the Sec-
retary's findings of fact so long as they are supported by substantial evi-
dence. 159
In Mathews v. Weber, 160 a unanimous Supreme Court, speaking through
Chief Justice Burger, approved the reference of social security disability
cases to magistrates. The Court determined that on the basis of the district
court's local rule,' 61 the reference to magistrates for preliminary review was
an "additional duty" contemplated by the Federal Magistrates Act. Rejecting
the Secretary's argument that the magistrate was functioning as a special
master, the Court noted that "not every reference, for whatever purpose, is
156. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1970).
157. In fiscal year 1975, there were 5,846 social security reviews. ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 8, at 226-27 table 34.
158. Id.
159. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970).
160. 423 U.S. 261 (1976).
161. General Order No. 104-D(A) of the United States District Court for the Central District
of California, appearing in part at 423 U.S. 261, 264 n.1 (1976), provides for reference of "[a]c-
tions to review administrative determinations re entitlements to benefits under the Social Sec-
urity Act and related statutes, including but not limited to actions filed under 42 U.S.C. §
4 05(g)." 423 U.S. at 264 & n.1.
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to be characterized as a reference to a special master." 6 2 Referring to sec-
tion 636(b), the district court's local rule, and the LaBuy decision, the Court
concluded that "[t]he Magistrate here acted in his capacity as a magistrate
. . . under a reference authorized by an Act passed 10 years after LaBuy
was decided.' 1 63 Finally, it was clear that the earlier Wingo decision should
have no bearing on the appellate review references to magistrates. 1'
While the Court went to great lengths to caution that its decision was
limited to the precise reference and to the local rule that was challenged,
the decision suggests that any local rule delegating a preliminary review
function to magistrates in social security cases will be permissible, so long as
the ultimate decision rests with an article III district judge.' 65 By local rule,
a district court should be able to direct the magistrates to make a prelimi-
nary review of the closed administrative record, and a recommendation as to
whether there is substantial evidence on the record to support the Secre-
tary's decision. 166 Such a procedure would provide substantial assistance to
the judge and the parties, and would be consonant with the Magistrates
Act's general purpose.' 6 7 By culling through what are often voluminous re-
cords and focusing the court's attention on the relevant portions, the magis-
trate would expedite the disposition of the case. With the parties participat-
ing at each step and addressing their arguments to the court on the basis of
the magistrate's preliminary evaluation and recommendation, this- procedure
would also narrow the dispute. Yet because the judge may follow the magis-
trate's report, ignore it, or conduct review in whole or in part, the full right
of the parties to judicial review would be protected. 1 68
If district courts take advantage of the Weber decision, there should be a
vast increase in the utilization of magistrates. During 1975, while there were
5,846 social security reviews filed, 169 only 537 were disposed of by magis-
trates. 170 Given the volume and size of the administrative records found in
social security cases and the Supreme Court's endorsement of a broadly
162. 423 U.S. at 273.
163. Id. at 274-75.
164. Id. at 275.
165. "The authority-and the responsibility-to make an informed, final determination, we
emphasize, remains with the judge." Id. at 271.
166. The Court suggested that where a case turns solely upon issues of law, e.g., statutory
interpretation, the case should be sent directly to the judge. Id. at 270 n.6.
167. During magistrates' salary hearings in 1972, a Senate subcommittee noted that magis-
trates may be authorized to review social security appeals. S. REP. No. 1065, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1972). The Judicial Conference approved a jurisdictional checklist of delegable duties.
Item 24 specifically discusses and suggests social security reviews. The checklist is printed in
Hearings on S. 1283 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Se-
nate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-26 (1975).
168. 423 U.S. at 271.
169. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 226-27 table 34.
170. Id. at 502-06 table M-4. The number of social security cases should eventually be halved
by the removal of Black Lung benefit claims to the Department of Labor, pursuant to the
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phrased local rule referring preliminary review of such records to magis-
trates, it is fairly certain that district judges will find it prudent judicial
administration to promulgate such a rule and take advantage of this oppor-
tunity to avail themselves of the assistance of magistrates.
III. RECENT AND PROPOSED CHANGES
A. Pretrial and Prisoner Petitions
The Wingo decision demonstrates one paradox in the current implementa-
tion of the Federal Magistrates Act. If a prisoner petitions a federal district
court pursuant to the Habeas Corpus Act, a magistrate cannot conduct an
evidentiary hearing; yet if the same prisoner seeks the sarie relief by means
of a Civil Rights Act petition, the magistrate may conduct a hearing. How-
ever, according to the Flowers decision, if an individual files a complaint
pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, a magistrate is barred from
hearing any evidence. These inconsistent determinations are the result of
statutes that require "judges" or "courts" to perform specific functions, de-
spite the fact that these functions are not exclusively the rendering of ulti-
mate decisions.
The best way to ameliorate this situation is by legislation. In the Federal
Rules of Evidence, for example, it is explicitly provided that "[t]he terms
'judge' and 'court' in these rules include United States magistrates." 171 The
Congress of the United States has in fact recently dealt with the Magistrates
Act.
In response to the Wingo decision, in which the Chief Justice registered
his support for supplemental legislation in a dissenting opinion, 172 the
Committee on the Administration of the Federal Magistrates System of the
Judicial Conference proposed an amendment to the Federal Magistrates
Act.173 In early 1976, the Senate passed an amendment to section 636(b)
very similar to that proposed by the Judicial Conference which amendment,
with minor changes, became law in October 1976.174 The effect of this
amendment is to authorize a district judge to designate a magistrate to per-
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Acts of 1969, 30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1970). At present,
almost half.of the social security reviews are Black Lung disability benefits denials. ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 8, at 228 table 35. But see note 211 infra.
171. FED. R. EVID. 1101(a).
172. 418 U.S. 461, 487 (1974).
173. Hearings on S. 1283 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of
the Senate Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 33-38 (1975). A discussion of the
Wingo decision appears id. at 36-37.
174. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577, 90 Stat. 2729. A full reprint of Pub. L. No.
94-577 follows.
An Act to improve judicial machinery by further defining the jurisdiction of United
States magstmtes, and for other purposes.
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Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That section 636(b) of title 28, United States Code,
is amended to read as follows:
(b)(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary-
(A) a judge may designate a magistrate to hear. and determine any pretrial
matter pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief, for
judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an
indictment or information made by the defendant, to suppress evidence in a
criminal case, to dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action, to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and to
involuntarily dismiss an action. A judge of the court may reconsider any
pretrial matter under this subparagraph (A) where it has been shown that the
magistrate's order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
(B) a judge may also designate a magistrate to conduct hearings, including
evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings
of fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court, of
any motion excepted in subparagraph (A), of applications for posttrial relief
made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses and of prisoner petitions
challenging conditions of confinement.
(C) the magistrate shall file his proposed findings and recommendations
under subparagraph (B) with the court and a copy shall forthwith be mailed
to all parties.
Within ten days after being served with a copy, any party may serve and file writ-
ten objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules
of court. A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions
of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection
is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part,
the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate. The judge may also re-
ceive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate with instructions.
(2) A judge may designate a magistrate to serve as a special master pursuant to
the applicable provisions of this title and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for
the United States district courts. A judge may designate a magistrate to serve as a
special master in any civil case, upon consent of the parties, without regard to the
provisions of rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United
States district courts.
(3) A magistrate may be assigned such additional duties as are not inconsistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States.
(4) Each district court shall establish rules pursuant to which the magistrates
shall discharge their duties.
SEC. 2. (a) (1) Rule 8(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the
United States District Courts is amended to read as follows:
(b) FUNCTION OF THE MAGISTRATE.-
(1) When designated to do so in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), a
magistrate may conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, on the pet-
ition, and submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and re-
commendations for disposition.
(2) The magistrate shall file proposed findings and recommendations with
the court and a copy shall forthwith be mailed to all parties.
(3) Within ten days after being served with a copy, any party may serve
and file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations
as provided by rules of court.
(4) A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those
portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to
which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify
in whole or in part any findings or recommendations made by the magis-
trate.
(2) Rule 8(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United
States District Courts is amended to read as follows:
(b) FUNCTION OF THE MAGISTRATE.-
(1) When designated to do so in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), a
magistrate may conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, on the mo-
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form additional duties "notwithstanding any provision of law to the con-
trary." 175 This provision is intended to assure that magistrates could be
permitted to perform those pretrial, nondispositive duties intended by the
Magistrates Act, and it would overcome restrictions derived from statutes
enacted prior to the Magistrates Act.
176
Amended section 636(b)(1) expands the civil jurisdiction of magistrates
and authorizes courts to delegate duties to magistrates according to whether
the matter is dispositive or not dispositive of the litigation. Motions for con-
tinuance, discovery questions, and general procedural matters would be con-
sidered nondispostive issues, and the magistrate's determination would be-
come the ruling of the court unless a party filed a timely appeal. 177 With
certain enumerated motions and determinations considered dispositve, the
magistrate would be empowered to conduct all proceedings, including
evidentiary hearings, 178 and recommend a decision to the judge, who would
then make the ultimate determination.
tion, and submit to a judge of the court proposed findings and recommenda-
tions for disposition.
(2) The magistrate shall file proposed findings and recommendations with
the court and a copy shall forthwith be mailed to all parties.
(3) Within ten days after being served with a copy, any party may serve
and file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations
as provided by rules of court.
(4) A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those
portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to
which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify
in whole or in part any findings or recommendations made by the magis-
trate.
(b) (1) Rule 8(c) of such Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases is amended by
striking out "and shall conduct the hearing" and inserting in lieu thereof the follow-
ing: "and the hearing shall be conducted."
(2) Rule 8(c) of such Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings is amended by
striking out "and shall conduct the hearing" and inserting in lieu thereof the follow-
ing: "and the hearing shall be conducted."
(C) The amendments made by this section shall take effect with respect to peti-
tions under section 2254 and motions under section 2255 of title 28 of the United
States Code filed on or after February 1, 1977.
175. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577 § 1, 90 Stat. 2729 (amending 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)).
Mhat language... was intended to overcome the debate they had in the decision
in Wingo v. Wedding, as to just what was meant when the statute on habeas corpus
uses the word, judge. And of course, it would be virtually impossible for Congress
to go through and amend every appropriate statute, to say judge and/or magistrate
.... So it is the intent of the drafters of both the Judicial Conference and the
legislative staff that that language "notwithstanding any provision of law to the con-
trary" is intended to cover just that situation.
Hearings on S. 1283, supra note 173, at 30.
176. See Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 468-69 (1974); JuDiCIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES ACT, reproduced in
Hearings on S. 1283, supra note 173, at 36 [hereinafter cited as JUDICIAL CONFERENCE] (cita-
tion to Hearings on S. 1283).
177. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577 § 1, 90 Stat. 2729 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 636
(b)(1) (1970)).
178. Id., (amending 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) (1970)). See TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d
348 (7th Cir. 1972).
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The amendment specifically provides, perhaps unnecessarily, that a
magistrate may be designated to preside over "applications for posttrial re-
lief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses and . . . prisoner
petitions challenging conditions of confinement," in the same manner and
subject to the same restrictions imposed for nondispositve matters. 1 79 This
provision, expanding section 636(b)(3), and the habeas corpus amendments
added to the Senate bill by the House overcome the problematic Wingo
decision by altering the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2243 for habeas relief
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254, 2255.180 Amended section (b)(1) concludes by
delineating the magistrate's reporting procedure to the judge and the par-
ties, and by providing a ten-day right of objection to proposed findings and
recommendations by the magistrate. 8 The judge's right to accept, modify,
or reject the magistrate's report, to consider the matter de novo, or to re-
mand the matter to the magistrate with instructions would be preserved. 1 82
The intent of amended section 636(b)(1) is clear. It would permit a dis-
trict court judge to designate a magistrate to hear any pretrial matter. The
reference would be made to the magistrate as a judicial officer, not a special
master, 183 and his function would be to discharge his duties qua magistrate.
All statutes that require a "court" or "judge" to perform a certain function
would be modified to permit a magistrate to conduct the task. Because all
determinations which would be dispositive of the matter before the court
would be reserved for determination by an article III judge, no constitu-
tional guarantee would be disturbed. Moreover, the provision does not over-
rule statutory provisions which are non-jurisdictional in nature. 184 The
explicit grant of power should encourage maximum utilization of magistrates
by district courts in pretrial and prisoner petition matters.
B. Special Master and Consensual Reference
Under the amended statute, a magistrate may still be appointed to serve
as a special master whenever the matter before the court appropriately calls
179. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577 § 1, 90 Stat. 2729 (amending 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B) (1970)). This would not cover applications to original judges for reduction of sen-
tences, pursuant to Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE, supra note 176, at 36.
180. See Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 469-73 (1974). Note also that section 2 of Pub. L.
No. 94-577, cited in full at note 174 supra, amends the habeas corpus rules of procedure
effective Feb. 1, 1977, to make those rules comport with the amended Magistrates Act.
181. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577 § 1, 90 Stat. 2729 (amending 28 U.S.C. §§
636(b)(1) and (b)(1)(C) (1970)). See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 176, at 37.
182. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577 § 1, 90 Stat. 2729 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 636
(b)(1) (1970)).
183. See Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 507 F.2d 1378 (7th Cir. 1974).
184. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970) (basis for judicial disqualification).
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for such a reference.' 85 These references are made by the judge sua sponte
and can be made without the consent and over the objection of the parties.
In these situations, the reference is one to a special master; the magistrate is
appointed to serve the limited function of a special master.' 8 6 Thus, the
controlling restrictions of the "exception" language found in Rule 53 and
LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co.' 87 have not been changed by the recent
amendment.' 8 8 The advantages of having a judicial officer serve as special
master at no cost to the litigants, as well as the absence of potential for
conflict or delay in making the appointment, speak well for the retention of
this section. The decision to retain the Rule 53 limitations was apparently
also motivated by the desire to avoid any constitutional complication regard-
ing ultimate decisionmaking by a non-article III judicial officer in a noncon-
sensual reference. 189
The amendment to the Magistrates Act also codifies the consensual ref-
erence notion discussed in the DeCosta v. CBS 190 decisions. Both the dis-
trict court and the appellate court decisions regarded the consensual refer-
ence to a magistrate as an additional duty not inconsistent with the Con-
stitution or federal laws, but one to be distinguished from a reference to the
magistrate as a special master. 191 The amendment technically categorizes
the consensual reference as one to a special master, but with a new twist:
the reference is to be "without regard to the provisions of Rule
53(b)."'19 2 The provision thus relieves the reference of the "exceptional"
limitations of Rule 53(b) and the LaBuy decision, while at the same time
providing the courts with a set of rules to govern the powers of the magis-
trate, the conduct of the proceedings, and the submission of the report.
No article III problems like those found in traditional references to mas-
ters are present in consensual reference. Unlike the special master reference
pursuant to Rule 53(b), this reference is not sua sponte by the judge but by
the consent of all parties. Hence, all parties concerned freely waive access to
an article III judge in favor of another forum. The favorable experience in
the federal courts with consensual agreement to alternative modes of dispute
185. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1970). See FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b).
186. In other words, the judge is referring the matter to a master pursuant to Rule 53(b) and
the magistrate is a person appointed to be master pursuant to Rule 53(a).
187. 352 U.S. 249 (1957). LaBuy continues to govern special master references. See Mathews
v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 274 (1976).
188. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577 § 1, 90 Stat. 2729 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 636
(b)(2) (1970)).
189. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 176, at 37.
190. 520 F.2d 499 (1st Cir. 1975), rev'g on other grounds 383 F. Supp. 326 (D.R.I. 1974).
See Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577 § 1, 90 Stat. 2729 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 636
(b)(2) (1970)). See also Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512 (1889).
191. 383 F. Supp. at 336-37; 520 F.2d at 507.
192. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577 § 1, 90 Stat. 2729 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 636
(b)(2) (1970)).
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resolution under the Federal Arbitration Act 193 would seem to undermine
any contention that such a consensual procedure compromises the dignity of
article III. In addition, the standard of review to be employed by the judge
would appear to be that generally applied to findings by a special master.
The findings of fact should be adopted unless clearly erroneous;194 the find-
ings of law should be subject to full review by the court. 195
C. "'Such Additional Duties": Automatic Referrals
The amendment of section 636 specifically states that "[a] magistrate may
be assigned such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Consti-
tution and laws of the United States."' 196 This condition, contained in
the central paragraph of the original section 636(b), was recognized as the
primary restriction on "the range of matters that may be referred to a magis-
trate." 197 This section is designed to encourage continued experimentation
and innovation by district courts in utilizing magistrates.19 8 By placing this
authorization in an entirely separate subsection, the drafters intended to free
it from any restrictions imposed by other specific grants of authority to
magistrates. 199 Furthermore, amended subsection 636(b)(3) should overcome
the obstacles to automatic referrals identified in prior cases.
*In the famous case of Los Angeles Brush Manufacturing Corp. v.
James,200 the Supreme Court interpreted Equity Rule 59's "exceptional con-
dition" language to forbid blanket referrals of patent cases to mas-
ters. 20 ' The petitioners argued that by referring all cases to masters, the
district court had established a policy that unjustly discriminated against
them because it exposed patent litigants to unnecessary trouble: the pro-
193. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1970). The First Circuit in DeCosta has suggested that "the decision
to waive in the case of a consensual reference is more knowledgeable than in the case of an
agreement to arbitrate a future dispute because it is made after the issue has crystalized." 520
F.2d 499, 505 (1st Cir. 1975).
194. See DeCosta v. CBS, 520 F.2d 499, 509 (lst Cir. 1975); FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a), 53(e)(2);
J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 53.12(4), at 3007 (2d ed. 1975). The parties could stipulate that
the magistrate's findings would be final, in which case only questions of law concerning his
report could be raised. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(4).
195. See DeCosta v. CBS 520 F.2d 499, 508-09 (1st Cir. 1975). In this respect, the DeCosta
appellate court overruled the district court's adoption of the "manifest error" standards derived
from Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512 (1889). See 383 F. Supp. at 338-39.
196. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577 § 1, 90 Stat. 2729 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 636
(b)(3) (1970)).
197. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270 (1976).
198. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 176, at 37. See Hearings on the Federal Magistrates
Act Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judicianj, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., at 81
(1968).
199. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 176, at 37.
200. 272 U.S. 701 (1927).
201. Id. at 707.
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ceedings before the masters were protracted and expensive. As the litigants
had to bear the costs of the proceedings, they were, they asserted, forced to
maintain a patent court at their own expense. The LaBuy case,2 0 2 decided
thirty years later tinder the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, reiterated the
issues of expense and delay as factors limiting references to masters.
The expense and delay problems that plagued the special master system
in Los Angeles Brush and LaBuy no longer exist under the magistrate sys-
tem. The perception of the master as a mere assistant to the trial judge,
which led the court in LaBuy to characterize that reference as "little less
than an abdication of the judicial function," 203 has evolved into a magistrate
system where findings of fact may either be determinative, or be left undis-
turbed unless "clearly erroneous." 204 In addition, by listing this power
separately, it escapes the restriction of the "exceptional" language of Rule
53,205 which would apply only to certain references pursuant to amended
section 636(b)(2).
In Mathews v. Weber,20 6 the Supreme Court approved the delegation to
magistrates of social security appeals. The decision permitted the automatic
referral of social security cases to magistrates, but the Court limited its hold-
ing to social security appeals and the specific district court rule in dispute.
Although the court expressed "no opinion with respect to either the wisdom
or the validity of automatic referral in other types of cases," 20 7 general use of
automatic reference is both constitutionally valid and wise.
There are no constitutional impediments to automatic referrals of social
security cases. These are appeals on the record; the magistrate's role would
be to review the record, summarize it, and make a recommendation to the
district judge. The ultimate decision, and the power to accept, modify, or
reject the magistrate's report, as well as review the entire matter de novo,
would rest with the judge. There would be no "abdication of the judicial
fnnction," but rather full compliance with the requirements of article III.
In fact, this is the precise procedure approved of by the Court in
Weber.208 Thus, in response to the Court's first qualification, automatic re-
202. 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
203. Id. at 256.
204. See discussion of consensual reference, note 190 supra and accompanying text.
205. See text accompanying note 199 supra.
206. 423 U.S. 261 (1976).
207. Id. at 274. While it expresses no explicit opinion, there is arguably an underlying as-
sumption of automatic referral in at least one of the decision's footnotes: "Experience with the
magistrate's role under the [Social Security] Act may well lead to the conclusion that sound
judicial administration calls for sending directly to the District Judge those cases that turn solely
upon issues of law." Id. at 271 n.6. The implication is that in cases not turning solely on issues
of law, the cases should be sent "directly" to a magistrate.
208. 423 U.S. at 270. The subsequent brief paragraph attempting to limit the Court's ap-
proval to the specific review function at issue, id. at 270-71, does not detract from the Court's
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ferrals of social security cases pursuant to amended section 636(b)(3) would
be valid.
The second consideration is the wisdom of automatic referrals. In 1975
there were 5,846 social security cases filed in district courts, a 63.1 percent
increase over 1974.209 These social security appeals accounted for approxi-
mately five percent of all civil cases commenced in district courts. 210 There
is, therefore, the potential to reduce a significant amount of a court's civil
caseload by automatically referring these appeals to magistrates. 21 ' This po-
tential has hardly been tapped: in 1975 only 537 social security cases were
disposed of by magistrates.2 12
Utilization of magistrates is not only prudent from a caseload manage-
ment perspective, but also from a judicial administration and political view-
point. During hearings on the Omnibus Judgeship Bill, which requested
additional district judges, the alternative of efficient utilization of magistrates
was clearly an important factor. 2 13 Thus, there is great practical wisdom in
sanction of such a preliminary review procedure. The rule involved was very broadly phrased
and can be duplicated by any court desiring to avail itself of magistrate's assistance with social
security cases.
209. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 226 table 34.
210. Id. at 195.
211. The potential relief available to district courts is even more pronounced when the
make-up and distribution. of the social security cases are examined. Forty eight percent of these
appeals are from denials of "Black Lung" disability benefits. Until the administration of these
benefits is transferred to the Department of Labor, and thus made appealable to the courts of
appeals, these cases will continue to flood the Social Security Administration and the district
courts. Most of these "Black Lung" appeals are concentrated in the district courts of coal-
producing areas. In 1975, Kentucky (Eastern District) had 667 Black Lung filings; West Virginia
(Southern District), 507 filings; Pennsylvania (Middle District), 403 filings; and Virginia (West-
ern District), 296 filings. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 225. Use of automatic referrals to
magistrates in these districts would greatly reduce the burden these cases place on the courts'
dockets. Moreover, magistrates would quickly develop an expertise in this area which would
bolster the efficient handling of these appeals.
Recent legislative developments provide additional support for this argument. On March 2,
1976, the House passed a bill amending the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 30
U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1970). H.R. 10760, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). "This legislation provides
that the district court of the state in which the claimant resides will have jurisdiction to review,
by civil action, any decision by the Secretary of Labor."
"Potentially, H.R. 10760 has ramifications for the magistrate workload .. 8 THE THIRD
BRANCH, March 1976, at 5.
Disability cases generally have created immense administrative problems for the Social Sec-
urity Administration's appeals process. See Smith, Social Security Appeals in Disability Cases,
28 AD. L. REv. 13 (1976).
212. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 502 table M4. Five hundred thirty-seven is a minis-
cule fraction of the 36,766 civil matters disposed of by magistrates during 1975. Id.
213. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 176, at 33. The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee
conducting these hearings "strongly criticized the chief judges of several district courts who had
been invited to testify as to their needs for additional judges because their courts had allegedly




the automatic referral process. Moreover, social security cases may only be
the tip of the iceberg. There are numerous administrative orders that are
appealable on the record to district courts. There is no reason why most of
these orders should not be considered subject matter that could be automat-
ically referred to magistrates using the same type of local rule and procedure
as those found in Weber.
D. Judicial Rules and Judicial Rulemaking
Under the original statute, district courts were to delegate additional
duties to magistrates by promulgating local court rules. Implementation of
this portion of the Magistrates Act appears to have been less than successful.
These local rules are not currently published nor is there any facility
through which one district court can learn what another district court is
doing to take advantage of the Magistrates Act.2 14 The Administrative Office
itself does not have a complete and current file of these local rules; it de-
pends upon the individual courts to forward such information. Confusion is
also created because many district courts establish magistrate duties through
"general orders" of the court, 215 and even those courts that do authorize
duties through rules often do not publish those rules with the bulk of the
court's local rules.
Because the amendments to section 636(b) retain the rulemaking
mechanism, 216 several improvements are necessitated. First, district courts
should only delegate duties to magistrates by establishing rules; these dele-
gation rules should be incorporated and published with the local rules of the
district court. Furthermore, each court should be required to submit all
rules to the Division of Magistrates or some other central office as soon as
the rule becomes effective. The rules of all district courts should then be
collected in one publication, distributed publicly, and seasonably updated.
This publication would remove any confusion that now exists and would
serve as a clearinghouse for courts to observe the substance and form of
duties being delegated to magistrates in civil proceedings.
Second, either the Supreme Court, the Judicial Conference, or some
similar body should have the power to promulgate certain uniform rules.
214. Part of this discussion is based upon conversations with Daniel R. Caven, Division of
Magistrates, Administrative Office of United States Courts. The only real set of guidelines avail-
able for promulgating local rules is the jurisdictional checklist published by the Judicial Confer-
ence and printed in Hearings on S. 1283 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-26 (1975).
215. See, e.g., Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976).
216. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577 § 1, 90 Stat. 2729 (amending 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(4) (1970)) provides: "Each district court shall establish rules pursuant to which the magis-
trates shall discharge their duties."
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These rules would deal with those civil proceedings in district courts that
are of a standard and national character and would parallel the treatment
afforded by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Consider, for example,
discovery. Discovery matters are delineated to a significant degree in Rules
26-37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Delegation of many discovery
duties to magistrates could be authorized by a similar uniform rule through-
out all district courts. This same approach could also be used with prisoner
petition duties and administrative appeal duties. However, the pretrial area,
where great discretion and flexibility have traditionally been reserved for the
judge, 217 would probably not benefit from uniform rules; each district court
should be free to promulgate local rules that conform to its particular pre-
trial procedures.
What should be avoided at all costs is a loss of the judicial rulemaking
power and a resort to statutes for delegating magistrates' duties. Statutory
delegation would stifle the innovation, experimentation, and flexibility that
are the underpinnings of the Magistrates Act. Judicial rulemaking is more
apt to achieve greater utilization of magistrates, and thereby fulfill the clear
and persistent intent of Congress. Certainly the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are examples of the
widely held view that court rulemaking is superior to statutes for the regula-
tion of federal court procedure. 218 Rulemaking for magistrates' duties in civil
proceedings should likewise be employed and successfidly utilized.
IV. CONCLUSION
Within the last decade, United States Magistrates have assumed an in-
creasingly significant role in the disposition of matters within the civil juris-
diction of federal district courts. Magistrates assisted district judges in the
disposition of over a quarter-million matters in 1975. However, unfortunate
drafting of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a mixture of hesitant and unnecessarily
restrictive interpretations of the section have resulted in judicial decisions
temporarily stifling the intended growth of activity under the Act.
Congress, the Judicial Conference, and the Chief Justice have made it
clear that they want to see greater utilization of magistrates in civil proceed-
ings. Congress's commitment to provide an upgraded tier of judicial officers
to assist district judges has been reaffirmed by its insistence upon greater
magistrate utilization as a condition precedent to the creation of more dis-
217. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16; F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.16 (1965); C. WRIGHT, FED-
ERAL COURTS § 91 (2d ed. 1970).
218. See F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 1.6 at 18 (1965); Ashman, Measuring the Judicial
Rule-making Power, 59 J.AM. JUD. Soc'Y 215 (1976). See generally The Rule-making Function
and the judicial Conference of the United States, 21 F.R.D. 117 (1958).
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trict court judgeships. Recent legislation which corrects drafting and in-
terpretation errors of the past, further expands magistrates' civil jurisdiction.
In addition, in Mathews v. Weber, for example, a unanimous Supreme
Court endorsed automatic referrals of social security cases to magistrates.
Courts are finding they are able to employ magistrates in an efficient and
effective manner, heightening the efficiency of the administration of justice
without sacrificing the quality of that justice. As the original House Report
that accompanied the Magistrates Act provided, district courts should con-
tinue to cull from their "ever growing workload . . . matters that are more
desirably performed by a lower tier of judicial officers," classify these mat-
ters as "additional duties," and have them performed by magistrates in a
local rule framework "consistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States."
SANDER M. BIEBER
